If I Was A Lawyer
Chwick v. Bondi, et al
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ALAN JAY CHWICK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
PAM BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants–Appellees.
Civil Action No. _______
PLAINTIFF’S TRIAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
I. INTRODUCTION
This case concerns the scope of the constitutional guarantee that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess and carry arms for lawful purposes, particularly self-defense. See District of Columbia v. Heller. The Court further held that this right is fully applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See McDonald v. City of Chicago.
Most recently, the Supreme Court clarified the governing analytical framework for Second Amendment challenges in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. Rejecting the means-end scrutiny previously applied by lower courts, Bruen established a text-and-history test: when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the government must demonstrate that its regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
Plaintiff contends that major federal gun control statutes—including the National Firearms Act, the Gun Control Act, and the Brady Act—cannot be reconciled with this historical tradition and therefore violate the Second Amendment.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Declaratory relief is authorized under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, and injunctive relief is sought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because the defendants are officers of the United States acting in their official capacities.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States who asserts the right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes including self-defense.
2. Federal statutes regulate the manufacture, sale, possession, and transfer of firearms and certain firearm accessories.
3. These statutes include:
the National Firearms Act of 1934;
the Gun Control Act of 1968; and
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.
4. Plaintiff alleges that these laws impose restrictions on arms that are commonly possessed for lawful purposes.
IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the National Firearms Act of 1934 violates the Second Amendment by imposing taxes, registration requirements, and restrictions on firearms or accessories that fall within the Amendment’s textual protection and lack historical analogues at the time of the Founding.
2. Whether the Gun Control Act of 1968 violates the Second Amendment by restricting interstate firearm commerce, prohibiting possession by certain classes of persons without historical precedent, and requiring federal licensing of firearm dealers.
3. Whether the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 violates the Second Amendment by creating a system of mandatory background checks prior to firearm transfers and whether its structure implicates federalism concerns under the Tenth Amendment.
4. Whether federal firearms statutes collectively impose unconstitutional infringements upon the individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the framework articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, courts must apply a two-step historical inquiry:
1. Textual Coverage: If the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the individual’s conduct, the conduct is presumptively protected.
2. Historical Tradition: The government must then demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
The Court expressly rejected balancing tests such as intermediate scrutiny previously applied by many lower courts.
VI. ARGUMENT
A. The National Firearms Act of 1934 Lacks Historical Analogues Consistent With the Bruen Framework
The National Firearms Act of 1934 imposes taxation, registration, and transfer restrictions on certain firearms and accessories.
1. The Regulated Items Constitute “Arms”
The Supreme Court has held that the Second Amendment protects weapons “in common use” for lawful purposes. See District of Columbia v. Heller.
If a weapon falls within the category of “bearable arms,” the Second Amendment’s text presumptively protects possession.
2. Historical Tradition Does Not Reflect Comparable Regulations
Under Bruen, modern firearm regulations must be justified by historical analogues from the Founding era or Reconstruction period.
The NFA’s tax-and-registration framework emerged in the twentieth century. Plaintiff argues that:
1. no comparable founding-era taxation regime existed targeting the possession of specific weapons;
2. registration systems for firearms were largely absent during the relevant historical periods; and
3. categorical prohibitions on classes of arms were uncommon.
Therefore, Plaintiff contends the NFA cannot satisfy the historical-tradition requirement.
B. The Gun Control Act of 1968 Imposes Restrictions Without Clear Historical Counterparts
The Gun Control Act of 1968 significantly expanded federal regulation of firearms.
1. Interstate Commerce Restrictions
The statute limits interstate firearm transfers and requires licensed dealers for commercial sales.
Plaintiff asserts that these restrictions burden the acquisition of arms and lack analogues in early American history.
2. Prohibited-Person Categories
The statute bars firearm possession by several classes of individuals, including felons and certain other categories.
Lower courts have generally upheld such restrictions, but Plaintiff contends that the historical record must demonstrate comparable founding-era disarmament traditions.
C. The Brady Act’s Background Check System Raises Second Amendment and Federalism Concerns
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act established a national background check system for firearm purchases.
1. Prior Restraint on the Exercise of a Constitutional Right
Plaintiff argues that requiring government approval prior to firearm acquisition functions as a prior restraint analogous to licensing regimes disfavored in other constitutional contexts.
2. Federalism Issues
The Supreme Court previously addressed related concerns in Printz v. United States, which held that portions of the Brady Act improperly commandeered state officials.
Plaintiff contends that the remaining structure still imposes federal regulatory burdens inconsistent with constitutional principles.
D. The Collective Structure of Federal Gun Laws Allegedly Conflicts With the Second Amendment
Plaintiff ultimately argues that federal firearm statutes, taken together, impose cumulative burdens inconsistent with the Second Amendment’s protection of the right to keep and bear arms.
However, courts traditionally evaluate firearm regulations individually rather than categorically, examining whether each statute fits within historical tradition.
VII. RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:
1. Declare the challenged statutes unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.
2. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting enforcement of the challenged provisions.
3. Award costs and any further relief the Court deems appropriate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen requires courts to evaluate firearm regulations through the lens of text, history, and tradition. Plaintiff argues that several major federal gun control statutes cannot satisfy this historical test and therefore infringe upon the constitutional right to keep and bear arms.
For these reasons, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant the requested declaratory and injunctive relief.
Respectfully submitted,
Alan Jay Chwick
Plaintiff, Pro Se
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